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Abstract. Software digital rights management is a pressing need for the
software development industry which remains, as no practical solutions
have been acclamaimed succesful by the industry. We introduce a novel
software-protection method, fully implemented with today’s technolo-
gies, that provides traitor tracing and license enforcement and requires
no additional hardware nor inter-connectivity.
Our work benefits from the use of secure triggers ([1]), a cryptographic
primitive that is secure assuming the existence of an ind-cpa secure block
cipher. Using our framework, developers may insert license checks and
fingerprints, and obfuscate the code using secure triggers. As a result,
this rises the cost that software analysis tools have detect and modify
protection mechanisms. Thus rising the complexity of cracking this sys-
tem.
1 Introduction
Software piracy has troubled the computer industry, producing millions of
dollars of losses, and rising numerous scientific and technical problems of
interest in computer security (see, e.g., [2], [3], [4]). Software is hardly sold,
but it is typically licensed according to policies defined by software license
owners. Licensed software is executed within the licensed customers’ com-
puters and is expected to be run according to license policy. For example,
the license may establish that only users from an authorized IP address
can use it, or that it can only run on a specific computer, or establishes an
expiration date. However, the license owner does not have any technical
warranties to enforce his policy, unless he uses a secure software protec-
tion system. The need for one such system remains after a long history
of trials (see, e.g., [5], [2]).
1.1 Background
Software protection aims at enforcing license policy through technical
means, sometimes profiting from special-purpose hardware devices, and
being supported by digital rights management legislations. Fingerprint-
ing is roughly defined as the act of uniquely marking and registering a
build of the program allowing the license owner to trace back a copy of
this build to its original licensee ([6]). Today, there is no agreement on
how can license enforcement and traitor tracing be implemented. It is
commonly acknowledged that given sufficient time (within human reach)
and effort an attacker will crack any protection system. As a result, soft-
ware protection systems attempt to discourage crackers by making the
cracking job a highly difficult (e.g., time-consuming) task.
In the past, software protection solutions have tried to make (por-
tions of) the software “unavailable” for inspection by its users. Assuming
available a procedure that provides this functionality, we could construct
a software protection system by making license checks in this “unavail-
able mode” (because an attacker cannot thwart license checks he cannot
access). Among other things, software protection studies how to provide
this “unavailability” through code obfuscation (see, e.g., [7], [8], [9]). Ob-
fuscation, in software engineering, comprises the techniques used for pre-
venting software analysis methods to produce qualitative results. On the
other side, reverse engineering (e.g., program comprehension; see, e.g.,
[10]), is the de facto software analysis discipline.
Regrettably, Barak et alii ([11]) give a negative result on obfusca-
tion in the context of computational complexity, namely that obfuscation
procedures can be defeated. More explicitly, they show that for every
probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine obfuscator, which receives
as input a polynomial-time Turing machine (hereafter TM) and outputs
a polynomial-time TM with the same functionality but such that only its
input/output behavior is revealed by inspection, there exists a polynomial
“deobfuscator” that learns more than just the I/O behavior.
Notice that [11] gives only an existential result, and the construction
of deobfuscators remains an interesting problem. Moreover, manual obfus-
cation is still possible, and the “international obfuscated C code contest”
([12]) is a good example of this. It seems that the notion of automated
TM obfuscation is too restrictive, and that a straight-forward computa-
tional complexity approach to software protection will not suffice to give
a definitive answer (whether software protection is possible or not).
Our thesis is that an hybrid approach, which combines computational
complexity with software engineering, can be used to analyze a software
protection system with the necessary detail. Evidence of this can be found
in modern reverse engineering literature (e.g., [13], [14], [15]). This work
follows a new research direction integrating hardness results to the soft-
ware engineering and reverse engineering disciplines to the design of soft-
ware protection systems (cf. [4], [16], [13]).
1.2 Prior art
In the past two decades (‘80,‘90) countering reverse engineering was en-
deavored either by encrypting the software, or by having it run on trusted
environments or tamper-proof hardware devices. Unfortunately, typical
hardware solutions have remained useless or too expensive (see, e.g., [17],
[18], [19]); the case of typical software-only solutions has remained invari-
ably insecure (see, e.g., [20], [5]). These solutions either violate Kherchoff’s
principle (e.g., rely on security by obscurity) or at least rely on hypothe-
ses on debuggers or hardware devices that cannot be verified (cf. [21]).
“Computation with encrypted data” (e.g., [9]) provides an alternative
approach, but no solution applicable to generic software has been found
yet. So it has often been possible to circumvent anti-piracy procedures by
reusable methods that could be wide-spread over the Internet4.
Some novel software protection systems, such as our own, aim to dis-
courage crackers by counter-attacking reverse engineering tools, for ex-
ample [4] provides an obfuscation tool-set aimed at obstructing static
(flow-sensitive) code analysis; [24] proposes tamper-proofing of license
enforcement by coupling license enforcement tools with dynamically self-
checking programs; [16] presents an obfuscation method that aims at re-
ducing de-obfuscation to solving the acceptance problem on linear Turing
machines (which is PSPACE-complete). However, these models for secu-
rity are incomplete and there remains to answer if they are secure in a
realistic sense (e.g., cannot be countered by crackers). The case of the
Trusted Computing Group ([25]) is different, TCG plans to provide a
new generation of personal computers that, among other things, allow for
DRM of content and software. This solution requires a technology that
is now unavailable, has not been inspected by the public, and it will take
years before this solution is effectively implemented.
2 Results
This work addresses two complementary goals. First, to present a semi-
automated method for software protection that addresses todays’ prob-
lematic, and can be implemented and used within the actual technology.
4 Crackers and hackers web-pages as [22] or [23] contain very complete lists of cracks
and serial number generators for almost every licensed software.
It enforces license policy, in the sense that it will not run when policy is
violated, and incorporates effectively traceable fingerprints. As a second
goal, we propose a very realistic model of security for software protection
systems, and analyze the security of our system.
We will assume the reader has some knowledge of software develop-
ment and cryptography. An introduction to these subjects can be found
in [26] and [27].
2.1 Architecture and implementation
The protection system can be applied to the source code of a C/C++
program, developed for win32 or Unix platforms5 requiring no additional
hardware nor connectivity. Additionally, we introduce a traitor-tracing
system that detects these fingerprints (e.g., if a licensee redistributes his
copy on the internet, he can be traced by this procedure). We describe
both procedures and give implementation directions.
The protection system requires the intervention of a programmer,
which need not be the original developer of the software, that we call
the developer. The protection process consists of two phases where the
source code of a program is transformed into a protected build. On the
first (manual) phase, the developer is required to add pragma directives
(directives for short) to the source code of the program that is being pro-
tected —specifying the location and name of the protection transforms
(e.g., for fingerprinting or obfuscation). The manual phase is performed
only once, either during or after development, and integrates to the devel-
opment cycle enabling debugging and barely augmenting the development
work. In the second (automated) phase, the protection system transforms
the modified source code into a customized build according to both the di-
rectives added and a configuration file containing a license ID and license
constraints.
2.2 Model and Security
The threat model is defined by a developer that uses this protection
system to transform the source code of the program into (protected) builds.
Each build includes an ID and license constraints, and is delivered to the
licensed customer as binary code. A valid attack against our system will
5 The underlying method can be deduced from this paper and then be extended for
protection systems on Java, Python and other programming languages —though
that is not the aim of this paper.
consist on a sequence of analyses and transformations to a set of builds
done with crackers’ tools.
Crackers’ tools are: Disassemblers and decompilers (e.g., [28]), debug-
gers (e.g., [29]), auto-decryptors and auto-decompressors, and analyzers
for: API access patterns, application flow, and binary layout data. Theo-
retic counterparts for these tools are mainly static analysis methods (i.e.,
those analyzing the code from a frozen image of a build; see, e.g., [30],
[31]), such as control- and data-flow static analysis; and dynamic analysis
methods (i.e., those that infer the program’s properties through running
a copy; see, e.g., [32]) such as frequency spectrum and coverage concept
analysis. We argue that by making our system invulnerable to these “the-
oretic counterparts” we are in fact defending from the real attacks.
Attackers are said to succeed at cracking our protection system if
they are able, either to bypass the license constraints, or to erase the
fingerprints (avoiding traitor tracing) using the aforementioned tools.
The security provided by this system depends on both the program
being protected and the directives inserted during protection. This ob-
servation differences our method from most protection methods. More-
over, we cannot assert that programs protected by our system become
un-crackable, but aim to prove that this system helps to make crack-
ers job more difficult. Our method can profit from the syntax of source
code implementations (e.g., flow chart, number of variables used, func-
tions implementations, etcetera) and the developer’s ability. We shall give
guidelines for the manual phase so that any programmer can use it.
As for the security brought by our system, first we remark that a
new interpretation of the secure triggers ([1]) technique, described in Sec-
tion 3.1, can be used to obfuscate programs securely (e.g., obfuscation is
as secure as a block cipher is).
Second, with our system the developer gains the ability to enforce
policy by binding the program’s execution code with environment pa-
rameters. In particular, by binding the program’s execution with license
information, the program will inject failures inside its own code, inevitably
crashing, if there occur discrepancies between the expected values for
these parameters and those actually assumed by them. Failures are in-
jected both stealthily and dynamically, making them more difficult to
detect (e.g., by static analysis algorithms).
Third, the protection system embeds fingerprints during the protec-
tion process that are spread throughout the code producing customized
builds. No two are alike (even locally). Further, the secure triggers tech-
nique referenced above will augment fingerprinting capabilities so that
cracking triggers is necessary for cracking fingerprinting.
Finally, notice that [11] does not apply to fingerprinting because our
fingerprinting method does not pretend to hide fingerprints from crack-
ers (as it happens with watermarking methods), but aims at replicating
fingerprints throughout the complete build so they cannot be removed.
In fact, this impossibility result does not apply to license enforcement
either, since in our case environment additional information —that is in-
dependent of the obfuscation process— needs to be fed for a protected
program to run properly. Using a suitable strategy for the manual phase
(see Section 5), both fingerprinting and license enforcement capabilities
will change dynamically during the protected program’s lifetime as the
different branches of the program are explored. More explicitly, the ob-
fuscated portions of the program will be actually encrypted with a block
cipher (e.g., AES), and the keys needed for decryption will be computed
from environment variables and program parameters (some related to li-
cense conditions) on the fly as needed. As a result, a cracker will not be
able to assert whether he has completely cracked a build until he has
decrypted every enciphered portion of code. We will argue later that this
is a difficult job, and hence so is cracking our system.
The paper continues as follows: in Section 3 we isolate the protec-
tion techniques required by this system. An implementation outline is
drafted in Section 4. Strategic considerations for the manual phase follow
in Section 5. Section 6 includes our conclusions and discuss results.
3 Tools and techniques for software protection
Our system performs transforms to the program following directives in-
serted in the manual phase. These transforms do not change the observ-
able behavior of the program. They comprise cryptographic or software
engineering methods that we introduce here as stand-alone algorithms.
Implementation details follow in the next sections.
3.1 Obfuscation through secure triggers
Secure triggers are cryptographic primitives ideally suited for solving
malicious-host problems of mobile computing (see [1], [33], cf. [7]). Gen-
erally speaking, given a predicate (i.e., a binary valued function) p :
{0, 1}∗ → {true, false} and a secret procedure f , a cryptographic trig-
ger is an algorithm that executes the procedure f on receiving the input x
only if p(x) = true, else it returns nothing. Secure triggers encompass al-
gorithms that compute functions t(f, p) and are secure against white-box
analysis, say, that given complete access to the algorithm that computes
the function t(f, p), it is infeasible for an attacker to recover any semantic
information regarding the procedure f .
Every trigger’s overall behavior is similar, after setup the trigger will
accept inputs and launch the secret procedure only if the trigger crite-
rion is verified by the input. In [1] three trigger examples: The simple
trigger will decrypt and launch the secret functionality if the input re-
ceived matches a predefined value; the multi-strings trigger decrypts and
launches if it receives a sequence of values that contains a predetermined
subsequence, and the subset trigger decrypts and launches only when cer-
tain specific bits of the input hold a predetermined value (see Appendix
for details). Browsing the code of these programs will render no key, nor
what are the triggering bits in the latter case. The hardness result of
Futoransky et alii, ibidem, states that: If there exists an ind-cpa secure
block cipher (see [27]), then no probabilistic polynomial time attacker can
recover semantic information for f when inspecting the algorithm T (f, p)
in any of the three examples described above. The appendix contains a
description of these triggers and the underlying security results.
Let us now describe how is the simple trigger used in our protection
system. The use of other triggers can be derived from it. Say that within
the program’s source code we isolated a procedure f . Assume that the
natural flow of the program assigns the value k to the local variable tmp.
Let E and D denote a pair of symmetric encryption and decryption prim-
itives. We then use a simple trigger (p(x) = true if, and only if, x = k)
by replacing the procedure for f by the algorithm on Figure 3.1, where
stored: iv, E(k, iv), E(k, f).
input: tmp.
output: S or ⊥.
compute E(tmp, iv);
If E(tmp, iv) = E(k, iv)
then {output D(tmp, E(k, f))};
Fig. 1. The simple trigger
E(k, f) denotes an encryption of a compiled f . A best usage strategy and
implementation details are included in Sections 5 and 6.
3.2 Fingerprinting
We are particularly interested in software fingerprints that are robust
and collusion resistant6. Our approach to fingerprinting follows common
practices (see, e.g., [34], [35], [36]) but profits from our architecture design
and the use of secure triggers. Furthermore, the secure triggers technique
turns this difficult-to-defeat fingerprinting system into a robust scheme.
The fingerprint module in our system is probabilistic: Every protected
program is customized from a different ID (used as a seed). Static finger-
prints are embedded by random modifications on the syntactic structure
or layout of the source code that do not modify its functionality. After
compilation, this random changes remain in the build. A suspected copy
can be identified with the aid of our traitor tracing tool (see Section 4.2)
by different statistic correlation analyses between the suspected copy and
those copies stored by the software license owner.
The cornerstone of our fingerprinting method comes from the real-
ization that programmers take arbitrary decisions during development,
that this variations are present in the binaries, and that this slack can
be harnessed for embedding fingerprints. Our approach is to have the
developer manually identify the places in the source code open to arbi-
trary decisions, and then have the fingerprinting module to automatically
randomize decisions on compilation. For example, developers arbitrarily
decide the order in which a function accepts its arguments; with our
method the developer will identify the arguments that can be arbitrarily
reordered, then on each build the protection system will randomly reorder
these arguments maintaining the code’s logic.
Other “permutables” include: local and global variable definitions,
function definitions, struct members, class data members, class methods,
enumerated types, constant arrays, object code link order, if/then/else
statements, independent statements. As a result, a single permutation
will introduce multiple changes on several parts of the binary code. For
example, permuting the order of global variables definitions will produce a
one byte difference in the binary code on each reference to these variables.
Random generated implementations for common-use functions (e.g.,
manipulation of constants, multiplication of large integers, etcetera) pro-
vide yet another fingerprinting channel. Say, for example, numeric con-
6 A software fingerprint is robust if the it remains even after disassembly, modification
and reassembly. The fingerprinting method is said collusion-resistant, if the method
remains robust even when the attacker is given a set of different fingerprinted builds
but cannot produce a single untraceable build.
stants can be replaced, automatically in each build, by functions evalu-
ating to those same constants —with a minor performance penalty.
Software byproducts, such as intermediate or temporary files, can also
be fingerprinted by methods similar to those used above aiding forensic
practices (see [37]). Candidates for byproduct fingerprinting include in-
termediate or temporary files, saved documents, configuration or state
information, network traffic, and internal data structures. Fingerprints
can be embedded, e.g., as order permutations, formatting and document
layout, and packet encapsulation.
Robustness is then achieved with no significant effort: since the marks
are embedded in no particular portion of the build but distributed through-
out the code. To erase these fingerprints an attacker would first need to
identify each of this random changes, then disassemble the said portion
of the code and make the necessary modifications to erase this random
changes following the code’s logic (e.g., if the protection swaps a couple
of global variables, a cracker attempting to erase this mark would need to
swap every appearance of this variables on the build). A more thorough
discussion follows in Section 6. See also e.g., [38] and [39].
Dynamic fingerprints can also be inserted in several ways. For exam-
ple, easter eggs (see, e.g., [34]) that hatch with fingerprinting information
when accessed with special inputs can be embedded in the program and
hidden through the usage of secure triggers. Say, for example, that if
someone inserts an entry to the program’s database of a lady born on the
year 2531, then the program decrypts and executes a function displaying
the license ID on the screen.
3.3 License Enforcement
We aim to make license enforcement by binding the program’s (policy-
conforming) execution to the values assumed for license parameters. More
explicitly, we establish two levels of protection. First level license checks
are used to inform the licensee when the licensed program cannot be
used at that moment (e.g., because it has expired). No effort is made at
this level neither to hide the location of these checks in the program nor
to prevent attackers from removing them7. The second level of license
enforcement does counter cracking. Our parameter binding method con-
sists in replacing certain program constants by functions that evaluate to
7 For example, if the software has an expiration date, then the protection scheme
checks for the current time with a standard system call. A cracker can hook this
system call always returning a date falling before expiration, procedure completely
breaks the first level of license enforcement.
the expected value for these constants only when the license parameters
hold values conforming with license policy. The process is quite simple:
During the manual phase of the protection, the developer identifies some
constants in the source code that he wants to get bound on compilation,
and he also supplies the functions that return license parameters (e.g.,
the present time, or the host IP number). The system will automatically
make the binding on the second phase.
We give a simplistic example for second level checks: Suppose that
license policy establishes that the software expires on 31-Dec-2009. Then,
the protected program will “assume” that the second (rightmost) digit
of the year is a 0, and thus several appearances of the constant 0 will
be replaced by the variable “second rightmost digit of the year.” If the
year 2010 is reached, and the attacker has circumvented the explicit checks
(but not the parameter-binding ones) every function that replaces 0 by the
variable “second rightmost digit of the year” will evaluate to 1, injecting
faults in the program, and forcing the program to crash while failures
spread during execution. In fact, different occurrences of the constant 0
will be replaced by different implementations of the function that returns
the current time (e.g., the time of creation of temporary files and other
timestamps within reach), making it more difficult to thwart these checks.
More generally, execution and operational parameters can be used to
specify license constraints such as number of records held on a database,
the time of the creation of a record, the number of simultaneous users,
usage time elapsed, and any machine identification parameter.
To circumvent this license enforcement method a cracker must identify
every license check and swindle the application with bogus information
(e.g., hooking these checks and always returning the correct values). Since
most of these checks will be obfuscated by secure triggers, the cracker will
need to break the obfuscation scheme to remove license constraints.
4 Implementation
We give details for implementing a system that performs the automated
phase of the protection process for C application projects (e.g., software
applications) under Microsoft Visual Studio for the win32 platform.
We shall require the use of different cryptographic primitives that can
to be chosen by the developer: A symmetric cipher, say AES in CBC
mode, a hash function, say SHA-1, and a random pool (see, e.g., [27]).
4.1 Architecture
The system consists of three procedures: the crypto pre-processor pro-
cedure (CPPP), the compiler, and the post-processor. Additionaly, it
requires a library including the functions underlying triggers (e.g., de-
cryption and integrity checks). The CPPP is the first module executed,
it receives as input a modified source code (e.g., that includes directives)
and outputs a randomized source code. At startup it initializes the ran-
dom pool as seeded by the configuration file (the pool’s required size is
proportional to the number of directives in the source code). Then, the
CPPP parses the source code individualizing the portions of code marked
for transformation.
Subsequently the transforms are applied according the random pool
and the marking directives. This system enables for the use of many
transforms. In the following paragraphs we give a flavor of the transforms
supported by this system introducing fingerprinting, license enforcement
and obfuscation transforms. We start with an example of the permutation
transform which reorders variable assignments:
fingerprint begin permute;
a = 5;
b = 4;
tmp = "hello";
fingerprint end permute;
The parser will identify the three assignments between the begin and end
clauses. Reordering is done by first enumerating the permutable lines and
then applying a successive swaps to the enumerated lines. Notice that
these modifications do not change the program’s functionality.
Another fingerprinting directive is prepended to if/then/else state-
ments as follows:
fingerprint if;
if (a < 22) printf("yes"); else printf("no");
According to the next bit in the random pool this will leave the statement
as it is or replace it by the equivalent statement
if (!a < 22) printf("no"); else printf("yes");
The fingerprint constant(value,size[,func=value2]) directive
can be used in the declaration of constants for fingerprinting and li-
cense enforcement. The CPPP will replace the declaration of the constant
prepended by this directive by randomly generated arithmetic expression
of size size evaluating to value8. For example, the declaration a:=2;
could be replaced by a:=4 - (3*2) + 5 - 2 + 1; which evaluates to
2. The optional argument is used for license enforcement, the function
func returns an operational parameter, that is assumed to take the value
value2 (see Section 3.3 for details).
Triggers are handled by different encryption directives. The code to
be encrypted is enclosed between directives, say between simple Trig-
ger begin(key) and simple Trigger end. The CPPP will identify each
trigger occurrence and add calls to the corresponding trigger function
(e.g., that of Figure 3.1 in the case of the simple trigger) including also
integrity checks, and will create a file in its working directory which con-
tains references to the blocks associated to triggers (by specifying the
starting line and ending line of each block in source code file). When
running a protected program, if a function inside an encrypted block is
required by the control flow of the program, the protected program will
automatically compute the decryption key, (implicitly) check the validity
of this key, decrypts the block, checks the block’s integrity against a pre-
stored hash value, and finally execute it. The CPPP also configures the
project makefile (i.e., where “details for files, dependencies and rules by
which an executable application is built” are stored in msdev) to link the
post-processor and the additional library to the project.
Then, the randomized source code computed by CPPP is compiled
into a binary build with the msdev C compiler. The output of this proce-
dure is an executable binary, except no blocks are encrypted. Encryption
is handled by the post-processor module.
Finally, the post-processor modifies the binary files computed by the
compiler, by encrypting specified blocks as needed and completing pa-
rameters used by the triggers. Explicitly, the post-processor makes two
passes on these binary files. For each block marked for encryption, it first
computes and stores its length in bytes and the symmetric key, and the
hash value for the cleartext; then, on the second pass, it encrypts the
block and copies on the build overwriting cleartexts and inserting auxil-
iary information.
4.2 Traitor tracing module
The traitor tracing module detects static fingerprints using simple statis-
tics methods. Let n be a positive integer chosen by the developer. Say,
8 Compiler’s optimization options can be switched not to destroy these expressions,
and still optimize producing a small slowdown.
n = 10. For every software build that has been delivered to a licensee,
the traitor-tracing module will analyze the binaries making a dictionary
of all the n byte strings appearing within this file. This dictionary is con-
structed by hash tables requiring a computation time proportional to the
size of the program and the number of copies delivered.
When a suspected build is found it is parsed into n bytes strings and
each string is looked up in the dictionary. Then, for each protected build,
the following statistic parameters are computed: i) the number of strings
that can be found only in the suspected copy and this build, ii) it also
computes the number of strings found in the suspected copy, this build,
and some other delivered build; iii) the number of strings that can be
found in the suspected copy and every delivered build.
Dynamic fingerprints such as easter eggs can be detected automat-
ically: A single-sing-on procedure will start the program and take the
necessary steps to insert the special entries on the databases so that the
hidden license ID value is displayed. More information on dynamic fin-
gerprints can be found in Sections 3.2 and 6.
5 The developer’s strategy
In this section we shall describe strategies for the manual phase that will
result in a stronger protection. We remark that the security of programs
protected by our system will depend on their characteristics and on the
developer’s job during the manual phase.
The recommended strategy will be aimed at making the fingerprint-
ing robust and making license checks hard to crack. We recommend to: i)
use the fingerprinting commands whenever possible, maximizing the ran-
domization within protected builds; ii) replace constants in the program
with the license enforcement primitive in error-prone places of the pro-
gram, so that when license fails the failures injected are hard to reproduce
and will get the program to behave erratically; iii) spread license checks
through the length of the code and within every trigger’s encrypted por-
tion of software; iv) maximize the number of access channels to the license
parameters (e.g., retrieve the actual time using different functions); v) in-
sert fake triggers, i.e., that are not reached by normal executions, both
allowing fingerprinting and making infeasible to the attacker the job of
decrypting every trigger; vi) nest occurrences of triggers; vii) make the
keys used by triggers non-obvious deriving them from variables that are
permanently updated (e.g., so that these variables take the value of the
key only when it is needed).
6 Discussion
This section servers two purposes, on the one side it describes the strength
of this protection system, on the other it complements Sections 3 and 5
giving insight on how to counter the attackers’ tools. We analyze the
strength of several attack strategies against our method.
We first discuss the effectivity of our traitor tracing module. Suppose
that we have recovered a pirate copy and want to identify its origin.
Initially, the developer will try to check for explicit client IDs. In case
they were removed by crackers, the traitor tracing module is run.
Attempts at “destroying” every fingerprint through code re-optimi-
zation are futile for several reasons. For example, because optimization
tools will not be able to difference between low-use and fake code —being
dead-code elimination an intractable problem ([40], cf. [41]).
Frequency spectrum analysis and other kinds of dynamic analyses
will not be able to difference easter-egg dynamic fingerprints from those
pieces of code that are rarely used (e.g., code that is executed only under
very particular situations). Also, since static fingerprints were provoked
by arbitrary decisions (that might look meaningful inside the code) an
automatic tool may not be able to remove them all. It turns out, that
typical software solutions for re-optimization cannot be used to delete
these fingerprints (we give more details below).
Furthermore, since certain parts of the code are encrypted by trigger
procedures, the attacker will need to decrypt them to find out if they
contain fingerprints and have them deleted.
As an experiment, a 1.2Mb win32 executable was marked with finger-
printing directives (and no encryption directives). Twelve different builds
were compiled (using different IDs) rising the compilation time of 45 min-
utes (without protection) in a couple of minutes (and less than an hour
in all if triggers are used). The resulting files were analyzed using the
traitor tracing tool doing statistics with n = 10 bytes strings in a few
seconds. The size of the resulting dictionary was of 440,000 values, for
the 1,200,000 totality of strings (recall that the file is 1.2Mb long). About
182,000 of the values of the dictionary were present in every build. For
each build, the percentage of strings appearing in it and no other build
ranged from 20% to 30% of the size of the dictionary —giving an excellent
identification ratio. On the other hand, an average less than 40% of the
entries in each build were present on only one other build. Cut-and-paste
attacks, collusion attacks attempting to replace pieces of a build by other
build’s pieces in order to remove fingerprints, are not likely to succeed
facing this statistics (e.g., almost half of the builds are needed to produce
an unmarked copy). In fact, cut-and-paste attacks fail because the mix-
ing builds produces inconsistencies in the variable’s assignations, and in
particular for those used by triggers’ functions.
To counter license constraints the attacker has two approaches ([3]) he
can either identify every function (within the protected software) execut-
ing a license check and patch it, or he can identify every attribute that is
checked and patch it so the miss-match cannot be detected. In any case,
attackers would need to analyze the program’s code in order to identify
what is checked or how it is checked. Notice that static analysis tools will
fail since encrypted portions of code will not be readable by these tools.
Also notice that, since the different portions of the code are disclosed
gradually (e.g., the program is not decrypted at once), new checks might
appear at any time (unannounced). An attacker cannot ensure he has
removed every check unless every single portion of the code has been
analyzed (even fake triggers).
So far we have argued that cracking is impossible, unless every trig-
ger occurrence is inspected and license checks are thwarted. A method to
systematically do this would inevitably take the following steps: i) Find
the decryption algorithm entry points (e.g., searching for decryption al-
gorithm’s magic constants). ii) Then modify the decryption function to
include a key-logger by adding a procedure that saves the keys used when-
ever a portion of code is decrypted. iii) Trigger every block, by intensively
using the application exploring every possible execution path. This proce-
dure will get every encrypted portion of code decrypted. Except step iii),
all the others can be automated and efficiently implemented. However,
following every path of a computer program is an intractable problem
(e.g., as difficult as the halting problem) that grows exponentially with
the number of branches in the program.
As we noted, none of the above attacks, attempting to reveal every
trigger block, is feasible. Further, a cracker will not be able to assert if
a trigger is fake unless he understands all the related code. But, that is
precisely our goal: making it necessary for a successful attack to take the
time and effort to understand the complete code of the program and then
erase the protection’s fingerprints and thwart license constraints.
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A Secure triggers
We follow [1]. Futoransky et alii, ibidem describes different secure triggers
in the “universally composable security (UCS) framework” of R. Canetti
([43]). We give a concise description of the underlying algorithms and
security results (for a complete description see [1] and [43]).
Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a ind-cpa secure symmetric cipher.
A.1 The simple trigger protocol
Let S ∈ {0, 1}∗ be a secret procedure described as a string of bits. Fix
k ∈ Z a security parameter. On set up we run the key generation algorithm
Gen to produce a key k of size k and arbitrarily choose a string iv ∈
{0, 1}k . Then we compute Enck(iv), Enck(S) and initialize the algorithm
in Figure 3.1 with these three values.
Security follows from the indistinguishability property of the symmet-
ric cipher (see [1, Th. 3.1]). Or, in the language of [44], for any attacker
A against this scheme there exists an attacker A′ against the ind-cpa se-
curity of the block cipher (with a single known plaintext), such that the
advantage A has is smaller than the advantage of A′.
A.2 Subsequence trigger
For the subsequence trigger procedure, the trigger criterion is satisfied
when a pre-defined subset of an input message (considered as a sequence
of bits) matches a particular value. Formally, let s, k be positive integers
with s > k. This trigger family is defined by the predicates
{
pK : {0, 1}
s → {true, false};K ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , s} × {0, 1},#K = k,
and if (i, b), (i, b′) ∈ K then b = b′
}
A predicate pK evaluates to true on input x = (x1, . . . , xs) ∈ {0, 1}
s, if
and only if, for every pair (i, b) in K, it holds true that xi = b.
To implement this trigger we construct an auxiliary family of (poly-
nomially-computable, uninvertible) functions from {0, 1}s to {0, 1}k , such
that a member τ verifies:
i) given x in {0, 1}s, there exist indices j1, . . . , jk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} ⊂ Z
such that
– τ(x) = τ(x1, . . . , xs) = (xj1 , . . . , xjk), and
– if y ∈ {0, 1}s is such that yjℓ = xjℓ for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, then both values
have the same output τ(x) = τ(y).
ii) τ is onto, and for every y ∈ {0, 1}k the cardinality of the preimage
τ−1(y) is 2s−k.
Assume τ has this properties, and fix values x ∈ {0, 1}s and b := (b1, . . . , bk) :=
τ(x). Let p be the predicate defined by p(y) = true if and only if
τ(x) = b. By hypotheses, there exist indices 1 ≤ i1, . . . , ik ≤ s such that
b = τ(x) = (xi1 , . . . , xik) and for every y ∈ {0, 1}
s that, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
satisfies yij = xij , the equality τ(x) = τ(y) holds. Hence, if p(x) is true,
then p(y) is also true.
With out further ado let Hash : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m denote a one-way
hash function and let the function family
{
σ(t1,...,ts) : {1, 2, . . . , s} × {0, 1}
s → {0, 1}k ; ti ∈ {0, 1}
m, for 1 ≤ i ≤ s
}
be defined by the assignment σ(t1,...,ts)(i, x) := y := (y1, . . . , yk) and the
procedure in Figure A.2. Given any function σ from this family, notice
that for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, τ := σ(i, ) : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}k trivially verifies
properties i) and ii).
The algorithm for this trigger can now be explained. Let S ∈ {0, 1}∗
be the secret procedure. Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a ind-cpa secure symmet-
ric cipher. On the initialization, we run the key generation algorithm
and get a key b = (b1, . . . , bk) of size k, we randomly chooses bit-strings
t1, . . . , ts ∈ {0, 1}
m of size m, and arbitrarily chooses a bit-string iv (of
size k), finally we compute Encb(iv), Encb(S) and store these values.
Stored: (t1, . . . , ts).
Input: i, (x1, . . . , xs).
Output: (y1, . . . , yk).
set i1 := i; y1 := xi; I := {i1};
for n := 2 to k do: {
compute i :=
(
Hash(y1‖ . . . ‖yn−1)⊕ tin
)
mod (s);
compute i := i+#{j : j ∈ I ∧ j ≤ i}; I := I ∪ {i};
set in := i; yn := xi;
}
output (y1, . . . , yk);
Fig. 2. The auxiliary function
Let σ := σ(t1,...,ts) be the function induced by the stored values t1, . . . ,
ts. Let x denote the input of the trigger algorithm, then this algorithm
for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s computes τ(i, x) and checks if Decσ(i,x)(Encb(iv))
for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s. If this happens, it must be that σ(i, x) = b and the
algorithm (computes and) outputs the secret S.
Security follows from [1, Th. 3.2].
A.3 Multiple-strings trigger
Let k, s ∈ Z be integers with s ≥ 2, where k is the security parameter
and s is the number of keys that are used to trigger. The trigger family
is then defined by the predicates
{
pk1,...,ks : {0, 1}
∗ → {true, false}; k1, . . . , ks ∈ {0, 1}
k}
}
,
where the predicate pk1,...,ks(x) = true on input x if, writing x = (x1, . . . ,
xt) there exist indices i1, . . . , is such that (xi1 , . . . , xi1+k−1) = k1, . . . , (xis ,
. . . , xis+k−1) = ks.
We describe the algorithm for this trigger. Fix s ∈ N. On initializa-
tion we use the key generation algorithm Gen to generate keys k1, . . . , ks
of size k, compute a random bit-string iv of size k, and finally computes
Enck1(iv), . . . , Encks(iv) and Enc⊕iki(S). These values are stored for the
algorithm to access. For every input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the triggerer proce-
dure checks for the existence of integers 1 ≤ i1, . . . , ik ≤ m such that
Enc(xij ,...,xij+k−1)
(iv) = Enckj (iv) holds for all j. If it does, it then com-
putes ⊕j(xij , . . . , xij+k−1) and S = Dec⊕j(xij ,...,xij+k−1)
(Enc⊕iki(S)) and
outputs S.
Security follows from [1, Th. 3.3].
